Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games

Abstract

Uncertain Demand in Transportation Reduces Worst-Case Congestion In “Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games,” Cominetti, Scarsini, Schröder, and Stier-Moses characterize the inefficiency introduced by self-minded travelers in congested networks, such as those in big cities. When the likelihood that travelers are present in a congested network is smaller, the uncertainty affects the resulting conditions but also what a social planner would do. Contrary to what might be expected, the consequence is a reduction of the worst-case expressions for the inefficiency of the prevailing traffic conditions with respect to the routes of a social planner. This reduction holds under two possible informational assumptions for the social planner. An ordinary planner only has statistical information based on past data in terms of the expected number of travelers, whereas a prophet planner is informed of the participation outcomes right when travelers start their trips.

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