References

• 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
• 1997Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence2,600 cited
• 2000Agency Costs and Ownership Structure2,517 cited
• 2001Toward an Implied Cost of Capital2,004 cited
• 1984A Longitudinal Study of the Corporate Life Cycle1,630 cited
• 2015Big Data consumer analytics and the transformation of marketing1,377 cited
• 1993The Impact of Information Technology on the Organization of Economic Activity: The “Move to the Middle” Hypothesis1,100 cited
• 2003Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development, and Industry Growth1,052 cited
• 2006Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers980 cited
• 2021Understanding digital transformation969 cited
• 2008What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts942 cited
• 1987Trade Credit and Informational Asymmetry881 cited
• 2006Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises751 cited
• 1978JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere.