Do Justifications Affect Tolerance for Administrative Burdens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment Among Policymakers

Abstract

ABSTRACT It is important to study what drives policymakers' tolerance for burdens because they adopt the policies and processes that organise citizens' encounters with the state. Relying on theories on account giving and rationale transparency, we argue that policymakers are more burden tolerant when provided with a justification for the existence of burdens. Drawing on the ordeal mechanism literature, we derive three justifications for administrative burdens: to target the neediest citizens, to combat fraud, and to protect public budgets. Using a survey experiment amongst local politicians in Flanders (Belgium), we show that policymakers indeed are more tolerant of burdens when they are provided with a justification. We show that burden justifications are more effectual in increasing burden tolerance amongst right‐wing than left‐wing policymakers and that they are more tolerated when justified to protect budgets. We find some evidence that tolerance for burdens increases when justified to target the neediest citizens, while fraud justifications do not affect burden tolerance.

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