The Political Calculus of Chief Executive Officers: The Influence of External and Internal Political Pressures on Turnover and Vacancy

Abstract

A wealth of literature highlights individual, organizational, and environmental factors that shape turnover and, more recently, vacancies, in public sector organizations. While existing research recognizes the importance of the political environment shaping these phenomena, it often focuses on direct political pressures rather than the indirect ways in which political control can be exerted. This study aims to compare the effect of direct political pressure with indirect political control exerted through governing boards and political appointees. We test our hypotheses using data on turnover and vacancies among presidents of institutions of postsecondary education in the United States between 2004 and 2019. Findings indicate that changes in the party of a governor have the strongest influence on the tenure of senior bureaucrats. Furthermore, the share of governing board members who are political appointees and the gubernatorial vote margin affect the likelihood and length of vacancy observed following turnover.

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