THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS

Abstract

By manipulating the screening and selection of executive bureaucrats, political leaders can indirectly\ncontrol the policy preferences that are carried out and enforced within a polity. In this article, we\nargue that precisely for this reason, partisan conflict over public policies often generates partisan\nconflict over bureaucratic appointments. To assess the empirical merits of this proposition, we\nanalyze a unique dataset tracing the careers of all agency heads appointed within the executive administration of Sweden between 1960 and 2011. We find that agency heads are more likely to be\nreplaced following partisan shifts in government. We conclude that even when political leaders are\nconstrained by strict civil service regulations on personnel management, partisan politics tends to\ndetermine the appointment of executive bureaucrats.

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