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Bargaining under incomplete information, K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, R. Myerson and M.A. Satterthwaite ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade, T. Gresik the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions, T. Gresik equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information, W. Leininger, et al bilateral trade with the sealed-bid k-double auction - existence and efficiency, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams the bilateral monopoly model - approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism, E. Broman the sealed-bid mechanism - an experimental study, R. Radner and A. Schotter minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables, P.B. Linhart and R. Radner a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences, A. Rubinstein foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture, F. Gul, et al reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere strategic delay in bargaining, A. Admati and M. Perry a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, L. Ausubel and R. Deneckere bargaining with common values, D. Vincent cheap talk can matter in bargaining, J. Farrell and R. Gibbons pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions, S. Matthews and A. Postlewaite credible negotiation statements and coherent plans, R. Myerson the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases - an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms, T. Gresik and M.A. Satterthwaite the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction as the market becomes large, M.A. Satterthwaite and S. Williams pollution claim settlements under private information, R. Rob.
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