The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics

Roger D. Blair · D. Daniel Sokol

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Merger and Competition Analysis Legal and Constitutional Studies Diverse Legal and Medical Studies

Abstract

INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases Daniel A. Crane 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences Keith N. Hylton 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions Peter Carstensen 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets Cory S. Capps and David Dranove 5. International Antitrust Institutions Oliver Budzinski 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II 7. Antitrust Settlements Daniel L. Rubinfeld 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis William H. Page 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury Jeffrey L. Harrison 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches Lawrence J. White 15. Market Definition Louis Kaplow 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee III. MERGERS 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement Howard Shelanski 20. Unilateral Effects Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel 23. Vertical Mergers Michael A. Salinger

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References

1984The Selection of Disputes for Litigation 1989Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution 1986Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs 2015Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 1994Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 2008Handbook of antitrust economics 1989Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information 2003Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study

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