Handbook of antitrust economics

Abstract

Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in matters. In earlier days, the application of rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to and in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term antitrust law and the European competition law interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of to bidding markets, network industries, and two-sided markets. ContributorsMark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Roller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Verge, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden.

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