Laws of Nature: do we need a metaphysics?

Abstract

In this paper, I briefly present the regularity and necessity views and assess\ntheir difficulties. I construe scientific laws as universal propositions satisfied by\nempirically successful scientific models and made — approximately — true by\nthe real systems represented, albeit partially, by these models. I also conceive\na scientific theory as a set of models together with a set of propositions, some\nof which are laws. A scientific law is a universal proposition or statement\nthat belongs to a scientific theory. Scientific laws also are laws of nature since\nwe can provide arguments in favour of natural causal powers that ground the\ntruth of laws. I argue that the truth of counterfactual conditional statements\nand the occurrence of regularities in nature provide good reasons to believe that\nreal causal powers exist in nature and that the (approximate) truth of scientific\nlaws is based on a metaphysics of nature.

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