Against Absolute Goodness

Richard Kraut

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.

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