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Belief's Own Ethics
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Belief's Own Ethics (2002)Belief's Own EthicsIntending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism (2018)Intending is Believing: A Def…Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment (2018)Evidentialism and Moral Encro…Believing for Practical Reasons (2018)Believing for Practical Reaso…The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)The Conflict of Evidence and …Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality (2015)Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzl…Epistemic Akrasia (2013)Epistemic AkrasiaJustification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Justification and the Truth-C…What Else Justification Could Be1 (2010)What Else Justification Could…The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’ (2010)The Epistemic Value of Moral …Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009)Democracy and Moral ConflictNorms of Assertion (2007)Norms of AssertionWhy we don’t deserve credit for everything we know (2006)Why we don’t deserve credit f…Why epistemologists are so down on their luck (2006)Why epistemologists are so do…Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rat…True Enough* (2004)True Enough*Knowing, Believing, and Understanding: What Goals for Science Education? (2004)Knowing, Believing, and Under…Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Virtues of the Mind (1996)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Normative Externalism (2019)Reasons First (2021)An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic (2001)Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification (2002)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2010)IX—Moral Encroachment (2018)Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Rationality Through Reasoning (2013)Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch (2018)The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (2018)Frege : Philosophy of language. By Michael Dummett. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xliii, 708. (1983)Laws and Symmetry (1989)Knowledge and Assertion (2010)The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion (2010)What Is Assertion*? (2011)How We Think (1910)How we think. (1910)The Development of Epistemological Theories: Beliefs About Knowledge and Knowing and Their Relation to Learning (1997)Multicultural education, pragmatism, and the goals of science teaching (2007)On the Relationship Between Belief and Acceptance of Evolution as Goals of Evolution Education (2016)Generating a framework for gender and sexual diversity‐inclusive STEM education (2023)Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. (1982)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY (2008)Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce (2013)Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Respecting all the evidence (2015)How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)The Value of Understanding (2009)Understanding as Knowledge of Causes (2014)Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong (2017)Between Facts and Norms (1996)Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1997)Development as Freedom (2009)Etica & Politica - Ethics & Politics (2012)Justice, Disagreement and Democracy (2012)Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century (2017)Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value (2009)Competence to know (2014)Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge (2017)
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  • 2012Justification and the Truth-Connection530 cited
  • 2007Norms of Assertion418 cited
  • 2006Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know391 cited
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  • 2015The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence318 cited
  • 2009Democracy and Moral Conflict205 cited
  • 2004True Enough*201 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Akrasia200 cited
  • 2010The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’197 cited
  • 2004Knowing, Believing, and Understanding: What Goals for Science Education?187 cited
  • 2018Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism185 cited
  • 2010What Else Justification Could Be1175 cited
  • 2018Believing for Practical Reasons168 cited
  • 2018Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment166 cited
  • 2015Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality161 cited
  • 2006Why epistemologists are so down on their luck

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154 cited