Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology

Abstract

Described by Hilary Putnam as "both a fine introduction and a significant contribution" to epistemology, and by Anthony Quinton as "at once comprehensive … and judicious," this book is unique both in its scope and in its originality. C. I. Lewis’s foundationalism, BonJour’s and Davidson’s coherentism, Popper’s critical rationalism, Quine’s naturalism, and Rorty’s, Stich’s, and Churchland’s anti-epistemological neopragmatism all come under Haack’s uniquely thorough critical scrutiny. Core epistemological questions about the nature of belief, the character and structure of evidence, the determinants of evidential quality, the relation of justification, probability, and truth, among others, are given refreshingly novel, and reasonable, answers.

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