Compulsory compassion: a critique of restorative justice

Abstract

This article takes its title from Annalise Acorn’s critique of restorative justice entitled Compulsory Compassion, in which she deconstructs rhetorics and narratives of restorative justice. After considering the meanings of restorative justice, the first part of this article argues that if something like compassion is a restorative justice value, then restorative processes seek to secure it by creating spaces where compassionate narrative is nurtured. We then consider Acorn’s competing narratives. Compulsory Compassion is the most beautifully written of the now countless books on restorative justice. It is also the most foundational critique yet to appear. Acorn once was committed to the restorative justice movement, but then became disenchanted. Her critique argues that restorative justice has elements of hypocrisy because it lacks authenticity, fails to accommodate peoples’ natural needs to give wrongdoers their just deserts, expects compassion in circumstances where this is unreasonable and oppressive, sentimentally links love to justice, and fails to come to grips with the satisfaction some people derive from dominating others.

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