Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches

Stephen Darwall · Allan Gibbard · Peter Railton

119 citations0/0 files storedThe Philosophical Quarterly

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

This is a collection of work on core meta-ethical issues. Naturalist moral realism, once devastated by the charge of naturalistic fallacy, has been reinvigorated, as have versions of moral realism that insist on the discontinuity between ethics and science. Irrealist, expressivist programmes have also developed with great sublety, encouraging the thought that noncognitive content can be squared with objective purport. Neo-Kantian constructivist theories have also flourished, offering hope that morality can be grounded in a plausible conception of reasonable conduct.

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