How Action Governs Intention

Abstract

© ,--' Nishi Shah O ( %(./+ you are o0ered a large sum of money to intend on Tuesday to drink toxin on Wednesday. The toxin will make you ill if you drink it, but you only have to intend to drink it in order to receive the money. Obviously, it is desirable for you to intend to drink the toxin, yet this fact seems incapable of moving you to so intend. Why is this so? 1 Does your inability to win the money reflect a flaw in your rationality? Michael Bratman has pointed out that when one deliberates about the future, one’s focus is on what to do in the future, not on what to intend now, although a judgment about what to do later does lead to an intention now about what to do later (23'4, 2-5). Understanding why this is so is the key to solving the toxin puzzle.

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