Ignorance and Moral Obligation

Michael J. Zimmerman

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Political Philosophy and Ethics

Abstract

Michael J. Zimmerman explores whether and how our ignorance about ourselves and our circumstances affects what our moral obligations and moral rights are. He rejects objective and subjective views of the nature of moral obligation, and presents a new case for a 'prospective' view.

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