References

No references inside the corpus for this window.

Cited by

• 2016You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ83 cited
• 2015If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ51 cited
• 2019Collective Moral Obligations: ‘We-Reasoning’ and the Perspective of the Deliberating Agent51 cited
• 2017Moral uncertainty50 cited
• 2019Fitting Love and Reasons for Loving45 cited
• 2017Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought42 cited
• 2019Revisiting the Argument from Action Guidance41 cited
• 2020Designing AI with Rights, Consciousness, Self-Respect, and Freedom39 cited
• 2017Prospective Possibilism39 cited
• 2020Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future*23 cited
• 2020Why more than what happens matters : robust rights and harmless wronging18 cited