An investigation of retailing techniques within a supply chain model under a leader–follower game strategy

Abstract

Nowadays, every sector opens a hybrid retail channel to sell their products to customers in the market to serve customers easily, and to provide the best satisfaction. In a supply chain management model, the manufacturer produces deteriorating-type products and sends these products to the retailer through an offline channel. The retailer sells those products to customers through three different retailing channels, namely online, offline, and buy online and pick up in-store, with different selling prices. The competition between the manufacturer and retailer is demonstrated through the leader–follower Stackelberg game policy. From the results, it is found that the centralized system provides better outcomes than the decentralized system. Comparing the beta distribution, uniform distribution, and triangular distribution, the triangular distribution yields more profit for the centralized system. For the case of uniform distribution, the centralized system provides 19.57 % more profit than the original system under manufacturer leadership.

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