Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to Eleonore Stump's and Norman Kretzmann's defense of eternalism against an objection of mine in 'A Problem For the Eternity Solution.'There I argued that, insofar as eternalism is intended as a strategy of avoiding the conclusion of the argument against freedom from divine foreknowledge to the effect that the traditional theist is committed to the violation of the principle of the fixity of the past, it does not succeed.I discuss two attempts by Stump and Kretzmann to reject this claim and argue that they are unsatisfactory.Finally, I sketch what seems to me the most promising line of defence that an eternalist might adopt in order to deal with the problem I raise.

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