In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth

Abstract

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME CI, NO. 1, JANUARY 2004 IN SEARCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF TRUTH* The layman...expects philosophers to answer deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world.... And the layman is quite right.... Yet he finds most writings by philosophers of the analytical school disconcertingly remote from these concerns.... The complaint...is understandable.... [Alnalytical philosophy passed, comparatively recently, through a destructive phase.... During that phase, it appeared as though demolition was the principal legitimate task of philosophy. Now most of us believe once more that philosophy has a constructive task; but, so thoroughly was the demolition accomplished, that the rebuilding is of necessity slow. —Michael Dummett' s a substantive theory of truth feasible? What would be the scope, structure, and content of such a theory? My idea of “a substantive theory” has the everyday connotation of “a theory that provides an explanatory, constructive, and systematic account of a rich, significant, and fundamental subject-matter.” “A substantive theory of truth” in this sense contrasts with “a deflationist theory of truth.” Where defla- tionists say that “truth is entirely captured by the...triviality...that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true,”q advocates of a substantive theory of truth (henceforth, substantivists) say that truth is not entirely captured by this triviality; where deflationists say that “the truth predicate exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need”3 (that is, indirect reference to, and generalization over, propositions), substantivists say that it exists for other needs as well; where defla- tionists say that truth is not a deep notion, substantivists say it is; and * lwould like to thank Roberta Ballarin,Yemima Ben Menachem, Charles Parsons, Carl Posy, Oron Shagrir, Peter Sher, Mark Steiner, Cory Wright, and the participants in my recent graduate seminar on truth for very helpful comments and conversation. 1 The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard, 1991), p. 1. 2 Paul Horwich, Truth (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), p. xi. 3 Horwich, p. 2. (A compilation of two sentences in inverted order.) 0022-362X/04/0101/5-36 © 2004 Thejournal of Philosophy, Inc. 5

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