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Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist
16 references·5 citing·39 second hop
Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist (2015)Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Inform…THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2009)THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERA…Reason and the Grain of Belief * (2008)Reason and the Grain of Belie…How Probabilities Reflect Evidence (2005)How Probabilities Reflect Evi…Decision Theory as Philosophy (1996)Decision Theory as PhilosophyA representation of partially ordered preferences (1995)A representation of partially…Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (1994)Critical Rationalism: A Resta…Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian (1993)Dynamically Consistent Belief…The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. (1992)The Dynamics of Rational Deli…On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers (1989)On the Shared Preferences of …Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making (1988)Unreliable probabilities, ris…Hard Choices (1986)Hard ChoicesUnreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making (1982)Unreliable probabilities, ris…On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesOn the Principle of Total Evidence (1967)On the Principle of Total Evi…Applied Statistical Decision Theory. (1962)Applied Statistical Decision …Applied Statistical Decision Theory (1962)Applied Statistical Decision …Deference Done Better (2021)Deference Done BetterDecision under Uncertainty (2021)Decision under UncertaintyDiscovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry (2019)Discovering Patterns: On the …Confidence in Beliefs and Rational Decision Making (2018)Confidence in Beliefs and Rat…Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation (2013)Uncertainty, Learning, and th…Coherence and the axioms of confirmation (1955)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms (1961)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion (2014)Ambiguity Attitudes (2015)Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm (2016)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959)A Treatise on Probability (1973)Subjective Probabilities should be Sharp (2010)Can it be Rational to Have Faith? (2012)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary (2015)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)A non-probabilistic concept of reliability (1994)An Introduction to Decision Theory (2009)On how to define, understand and describe risk (2010)The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (1959)Risk, ambiguity, and insurance (1989)Communicating scientific uncertainty (2014)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability (1967)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences (2009)Publication bias and the canonization of false facts (2016)Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States (1996)Stable games and their dynamics (2009)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment (1971)A Conditionally Heteroskedastic Time Series Model for Speculative Prices and Rates of Return (1987)Bayesian Experimental Design: A Review (1995)Bandit Processes and Dynamic Allocation Indices (1979)On the aggregation of information in competitive markets (1980)The real term structure and consumption growth (1988)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962Applied Statistical Decision Theory2,172 cited
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  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 1996Decision Theory as Philosophy459 cited
  • 1988Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making342 cited
  • 1967On the Principle of Total Evidence329 cited
  • 1982Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making325 cited
  • 1992The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.307 cited
  • 2009THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT271 cited
  • 2005How Probabilities Reflect Evidence239 cited
  • 1986Hard Choices238 cited
  • 1993Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian222 cited
  • 1994Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence177 cited
  • 2008Reason and the Grain of Belief *165 cited
  • 1995A representation of partially ordered preferences163 cited
  • 1989On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers116 cited

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2013
Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation
27 cited
  • 2021Deference Done Better26 cited
  • 2019Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry19 cited
  • 2018Confidence in Beliefs and Rational Decision Making3 cited
  • 2021Decision under Uncertainty1 cited