Lying is a critical concept in several areas of philosophy. It has been extensively discussed by moral philosophers (e. g., Augustine 1952 [395], Kant 1959 [1785], Bok 1978) and, more recently, by epistemologists of testimony (e. g., Faulkner 2007, Lackey 2008). Thus, it is important for philosophers to have a clear understanding of what lying is (cf. Carson 2006, 284; Mahon 2008; Fallis 2009, 30). Pretty much everybody agrees with George Costanza that “it’s not a lie if you believe it.” In other words, in order to lie, you at least have to say something that you believe to be false.1 But lying is not simply saying something that you believe to be false. For example, if you say “I am the Prince of Denmark” while performing a play, you are not lying. Similarly, if you say “I am the Prince of Denmark” and follow this statement with a wink to indicate that you are not to be taken seriously, you are not lying. So, there must be some additional condition that lies must meet. According to the standard philosophical definition of lying, the additional condition is an intention to deceive (cf. Augustine 1952 [395], 56; Bok 1978, 13; Kupfer 1982, 104; Williams 2002, 96; Mahon 2008, section 1.4).2 L1 You lie to X if and only if:
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