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Abstract This chapter first argues (following Tomasello, 1995) that for joint attention to be truly joint, rather than just parallel attention to the same thing, participants need to know together that they are sharing attention. The chapter examines the existing empirical evidence to determine whether nonhuman apes—and when human infants—engage in joint attention using this definition. The conclusion is that whereas human infants engage in truly joint joint attention by 1 year of age, there is so far little if any convincing evidence that chimpanzees and other apes do. The chapter ends by discussing possible reasons for differences between humans and apes in joint attention and other related abilities such as joint action.
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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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