Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality

Abstract

Two theses are central to recent work on the epistemology of disagreement: Uniqueness (‘U’): For any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Equal Weight (‘EW’): In cases of epistemic peer disagreement, one should give equal weight to the attitude of a peer and to one’s own attitude.2 Roger White [2005] and Richard Feldman ([2003: 185-6] and [2007]) offer arguments for U. A version of EW for all-or-nothing belief is defended by Feldman ([2003], [2006], [2007]), while versions applicable to degreed belief are championed by David Christensen [2007] and Adam Elga [2007]. We shall focus on U. Endorsing it, we’ll argue, commits one to the highly controversial thesis that whatever fixes your rational attitudes can do so only by fixing what evidence you have. This commitment imposes a relatively demanding requirement on justified belief in U, one that we argue isn’t satisfied by what is currently the strongest available case for U. Our challenge to U makes more trouble for its proponents than do the worries about U expressed by Gideon Rosen [2001: 71-72] and Thomas Kelly [2010: 117-121]. Moreover, if Kelly [2010: 121] is correct in thinking that EW “carries with it a commitment to ” U—a claim which we accept for reasons similar to Kelly’s but is beyond this paper’s scope3—then our challenge to U bears importantly on EW: to the extent that our challenge to U succeeds, EW also suffers.4

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