Part 1 The ten problems - phenomenal consciousness introduced, the problem of ownership, the problem of perspectival subjectivity, the problem of mechanism, the problem of phenomenal causation, the problem of super blindsight, the problem of duplicates, the problem of the inverted spectrum, the problem of transparency, the problem of felt location and phenomenal vocabulary, the problem of the alien limb why the problem run so deep - must the physical be objective? perspectival subjectivity and the explanatory gap, physicalism and phenomenal causation, on the denial of perspectival subjectivity, the paradox of phenomenal consciousness, the available strategies, the way ahead. Part 2 Can anyone else feel my pains? - the repudiation of phenomenal objects, publicising the phenomenal: split brains, phenomenal objects as events, a closer look at events the intentionality of feelings and experiences - intentional states and intentional content, how perceptual sensations represent, afterimages, the problem of ownership revisited, pains, other bodily sensations, the format of sensory representations, background feelings, emotions, moods what what it's like is really like - why be an intentionalist? phenomenal content: the PANIC theory, colours and other 'secondary qualities', can duplicate brains differ phenomenally? some putative counterexamples the tale of Mary and mechanism - a theory of perspectival subjectivity - the real nature of the phenomenal, perspectival subjectivity and the paradox, Mary's room, some of Mary's philosophical relatives, the explanatory gap can you really imagine what you think you can? - the status of the PANIC theory, imaginability of perceptions - a parallel, troublesome possibilities? zombie replicas and other duplicates, inverted experiences, inverted Earth. Appendices: blindsight - three sorts of visual agnosia an empirical proposal.
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