BookIllusionism: as a theory of consciousnessKeith Frankish2017Illusionism: as a theory of consciousnessKeith Frankish2017-11-14book436 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsFree Will and AgencyAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 436 citations exist upstream.References1972Naming and Necessity1996The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory1990The Intrinsic Quality of Experience2000Consciousness, Color, and Content1956IS CONSCIOUSNESS A BRAIN PROCESS?2002Thinking about Consciousnessn.d.Ten problems of consciousness a representational theory of the phenomenal mind1970Sensations and brain processesCited by2018The Meta-Problem of Consciousness2024The Edge of Sentience2019Why Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience2019Human and Animal Minds2018On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness2019Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories2021The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience2022Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value