Joined-up government: rational administration or bureaucratic politics?

Abstract

Joined-up government is often viewed as a remedy for coordination\nproblems arising in the complex multi-organisational terrain of contemporary public\nservices. Governments extol the virtues of formal coordination mechanisms as tools\nof joined-up government, both locally and centrally. Such policy exhortations\nconceive of joined-up government from a rational-administrative perspective which\nimplies that actors adopt coordination mechanisms as a functional response to\nsystemic problems. This paper explores the rationale behind the selection of\ncoordination mechanisms from the perspective of policy actors at different levels of\ngovernment, using evidence from a recent study of joined-up government in the field\nof homelessness. It is argued that decisions about joining-up are the outcome of\nstrategic and instrumental moves between actors, with each pursuing their own\norganisational interests and the outcome favouring the most powerful, motivations\nthat are better encapsulated by a bureaucratic politics model. Key aspects dominating\ncollaborative decision-making include prioritisation of, and a desire to protect\nresources for, agencies’ and departments’ own client groups; the greater ability of the\nmost powerful actors to gain the cooperation of other bodies in order to advance their\nown organisational agendas; and the adoption of coordination mechanisms to reduce\nrisk and maintain organisational survival

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