Computational Models of Attention and Cognitive Control

Abstract

Computational models are like the new kids in town for the field of decision making. This field is dominated by axiomatic utility theories or simple heuristic rule models. Decision theory has a long history, starting as early as the seventeenth century with probabilistic theories of gambling by Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat. In an attempt to retain the basic utility framework, constraints on utility theories are being relaxed, and the formulas are becoming more deformed. Recently, many researchers have responded to the growing corpus of phenomena that challenge traditional utility models by applying wholly different approaches. This chapter provides concrete illustration of how the computational approach can account for all of the behavioral paradoxes that have contested utility theories. The extent to which the other computational models have been successful in accounting for the results is also discussed.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 15 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.