In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?

Abstract

In this chapter, the idea that emotions are evaluations is introduced. It explores two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgements. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. This chapter explains why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue of their contents. An alternative is then outlined—the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the idea that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. Finally, the issue of what sorts of attitudes emotions are is examined, and the conclusion reached that they are felt bodily attitudes.

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