Intuitions as Evidence

Joel Pust

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

First published in 2000. Starting with Kripke's quotation on intuitive content being philosophic evidence, in this essay, the author aims to demonstrate how contemporary philosophy relies on intuitions as evidence, to explain what intuitions are and show why certain contemporary arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence fail.

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2002Pathways to Knowledge 2009Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference 2010Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy 2010On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic 2012Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers 2014Philosophical Expertise 2009Intuitions are inclinations to believe 2011Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements

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