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Intuitions as Evidence
0 references·16 citing·42 second hop
Intuitions as Evidence (2013)Intuitions as EvidenceUnderstanding and Inference1 (2020)Understanding and Inference1Debating the A Priori (2020)Debating the A PrioriOn Evidence in Philosophy (2019)On Evidence in PhilosophyMoral Knowledge (2019)Moral KnowledgeWhat Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics? (2017)What Can We Do, When We Do Me…Philosophical Expertise (2014)Philosophical ExpertiseKnowing How without Knowing That (2012)Knowing How without Knowing T…Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers (2012)Experimental Attacks on Intui…Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements (2011)Rationalism and the Content o…On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic (2010)On intuitional stability: The…Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy (2010)Intuitions, Counter-Examples,…Intuitions are inclinations to believe (2009)Intuitions are inclinations t…Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference (2009)Experimental Philosophy and t…Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium (2007)Philosophical Thought Experim…A defense of intuitions (2007)A defense of intuitionsPathways to Knowledge (2002)Pathways to KnowledgeActions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)Folk Mereology is Teleological (2015)Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge (2016)Naming and Necessity (1972)Studies in the Way of Words (1989)The Concept of Mind (2006)A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions (2010)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)Moral Intuition (2013)The Minimalist Program (2014)A theory of justice original editionGender and Philosophical Intuition* (2014)Knowledge and the Gettier Problem (2016)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory (1996)Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Running risks morally (2013)Games, Beliefs and Credences (2014)The Epistemology of Modality (2017)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience (2015)Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy (2017)Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making (2005)Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study (2017)THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1963)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. (1977)Judgment under Uncertainty (1982)Folkscience: coarse interpretations of a complex reality (2003)Epistemic Entitlement (2011)Reconceptualizing nature‐of‐science education in the age of social media (2020)Philosophical Investigations. (1954)Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic (2023)An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Principled Ethics (2006)PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY AND LEVELS OF GENERALITY (2019)Normative Models and Their Success (2020)
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Cited by

  • 2002Pathways to Knowledge174 cited
  • 2009Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference163 cited
  • 2010Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy155 cited
  • 2010On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic151 cited
  • 2012Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers147 cited
  • 2014Philosophical Expertise138 cited
  • 2009Intuitions are inclinations to believe137 cited
  • 2011Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements126 cited
  • 2019Moral Knowledge106 cited
  • 2020Debating the A Priori97 cited
  • 2007Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium93 cited
  • 2019On Evidence in Philosophy79 cited
  • 2020Understanding and Inference179 cited
  • 2012Knowing How without Knowing That78 cited
  • 2017What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics?77 cited
  • 2007A defense of intuitions74 cited

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