The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem

Abstract

This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based onmeta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which areaccessibleto her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world.

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