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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief
9 references·16 citing·32 second hop
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism I…Higher‐Order Evidence 1 (2010)Higher‐Order Evidence 1Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Reflection and DisagreementEpistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Epistemology of Disagreement:…The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2005)The Epistemic Significance of…Epistemic Permissiveness (2005)Epistemic PermissivenessConsidered Judgment (1996)Considered JudgmentThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)The Structure of Empirical Kn…Belief and the Will (1984)Belief and the WillOn Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesWhy Ideal Epistemology? (2021)Why Ideal Epistemology?Rational Polarization (2021)Rational PolarizationConversational Pressure (2020)Conversational PressureNormative Externalism (2019)Normative ExternalismKnowing Our Limits (2019)Knowing Our LimitsEvidence: A Guide for the Uncertain (2019)Evidence: A Guide for the Unc…Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters (2018)Belief and credence: why the …Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)Uniqueness and Metaepistemolo…The Uniqueness Thesis (2016)The Uniqueness ThesisPERMISSIVISM AND THE ARBITRARINESS OBJECTION (2016)PERMISSIVISM AND THE ARBITRAR…Irrelevant Influences (2016)Irrelevant InfluencesDISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA (2016)DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FR…An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support (2016)An Argument for Uniqueness Ab…No Exception for Belief (2015)No Exception for BeliefMORAL DISAGREEMENT AND MORAL SKEPTICISM (2014)MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND MORAL …Immoderately rational (2013)Immoderately rationalContemporary Theories of Knowledge. (1988)YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1 (2010)The Epistemology of Disagreement (2013)The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence (2015)The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. (1995)Warranted Christian Belief (2000)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Fake News and Partisan Epistemology (2017)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. (1987)Laws and Symmetry (1989)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)What is Epistemic Blame? (2018)Desire as Belief (2021)Why Double-Check? (2022)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)Truth and the Absence of Fact (2001)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002)Moral Realism (2003)Origins of Objectivity (2010)Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (1999)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)Thinking in Education (2003)Understanding and the facts (2006)How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988The Structure of Empirical Knowledge1,165 cited
  • 2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News984 cited
  • 2007Reflection and Disagreement660 cited
  • 2005The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement597 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 2005Epistemic Permissiveness544 cited
  • 1984Belief and the Will536 cited
  • 1996Considered Judgment400 cited
  • 2010Higher‐Order Evidence 1386 cited

Cited by

  • 2019Normative Externalism318 cited
  • 2015No Exception for Belief187 cited
  • 2016Uniqueness and Metaepistemology166 cited
  • 2014MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND MORAL SKEPTICISM150 cited
  • 2016Irrelevant Influences144 cited
  • 2020Conversational Pressure129 cited
  • 2018Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters125 cited
  • 2019Knowing Our Limits121 cited
  • 2013

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Immoderately rational
119 cited
  • 2016An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support110 cited
  • 2021Rational Polarization108 cited
  • 2016The Uniqueness Thesis105 cited
  • 2016DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA94 cited
  • 2021Why Ideal Epistemology?91 cited
  • 2019Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain89 cited
  • 2016PERMISSIVISM AND THE ARBITRARINESS OBJECTION77 cited