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Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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References

1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information2,002 cited
1964A Theory of Oligopoly1,817 cited
1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
1986Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring668 cited
1985Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting383 cited
1998Private Observation, Communication and Collusion334 cited
1998Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring254 cited
2002A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma219 cited
1986Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting192 cited
2002Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring175 cited
2002The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring169 cited
2002Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring156 cited
1997Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring146 cited
2006Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies98 cited

Cited by

2005MONEY IS PRIVACY*127 cited
2007

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Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

97 cited

2009The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion*72 cited

2008Folk theorem with communication62 cited