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The complexity of bribery in elections

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References

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2002Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates

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Cited by

2010Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates84 cited
2011Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery81 cited
2009Sincere‐Strategy Preference‐Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control79 cited
2015Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates71 cited