SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Moral hazard with several agents
15 references·4 citing·35 second hop
Moral hazard with several agents (1993)Moral hazard with several agentsToward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm (2013)Toward an Economic Model of t…Collusion and the theory of organizations (2008)Collusion and the theory of o…Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations (1991)Incentives to Help in Multi-A…Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy (1990)Analysis of Hidden Gaming in …Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents (1988)Unique Implementation of Ince…Stopping agents from “cheating” (1988)Stopping agents from “cheatin…Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies…Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations (1986)Cooperation in Ongoing Organi…Hierarchies and bureaucracies (1985)Hierarchies and bureaucraciesOptimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents (1984)Optimal Incentive Schemes wit…Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984)Optimal incentive contracts w…Advances in Economic Theory (1983)Advances in Economic TheoryMoral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsOrganization and environment (1967)Organization and environmentNew Patterns of Management. (1962)New Patterns of Management.The Rise of Individual Performance Pay (2012)The Rise of Individual Perfor…Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives (2009)Market Competition and Lower …Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment (1998)Centralized and Decentralized…The Role of Opportunism in Transaction Cost Economics (1997)The Role of Opportunism in Tr…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending (1999)Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003)Incentives That Induce Task-Related Effort, Helping, and Knowledge Sharing in Workgroups (2007)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Subgame Perfect Implementation (1988)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money (1958)On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth (1968)Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action (1987)Parties as Political Intermediaries (2002)Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment? (2003)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)The Social Psychology of Organizations. (1979)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (1983)The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems (1999)Creating a Strategic Center to Manage a Web of Partners (1995)From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order (1996)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? (1995)International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (2006)Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (2009)The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments (1965)What is job satisfaction? (1969)Gender and leadership style: A meta-analysis. (1990)Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers (1984)Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness and Structural Design (1986)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1967Organization and environment5,198 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1962New Patterns of Management.3,105 cited
  • 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
  • 2013Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm987 cited
  • 1984Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents506 cited
  • 1991Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations464 cited
  • 2008Collusion and the theory of organizations372 cited
  • 1984Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents317 cited
  • 1986Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations201 cited
  • 1983Advances in Economic Theory176 cited
  • 1988Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents169 cited
  • 1988Stopping agents from “cheating”158 cited
  • 1990Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy112 cited
  • 1985Hierarchies and bureaucracies94 cited

Cited by

  • 1997The Role of Opportunism in Transaction Cost Economics95 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

1998
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment
60 cited
  • 2009Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives42 cited
  • 2012The Rise of Individual Performance Pay33 cited