Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor

Kenny Easwaran

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Abstract Bayesianism is a popular position (or perhaps, positions) in the philosophy of science, epistemology, statistics, and other related areas, which represents belief as coming in degrees, measured by a probability function. In this article, I give an overview of the unifying features of the different positions called ‘Bayesianism’, and discuss several of the arguments traditionally used to support them.

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1979Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk 1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1961Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms 1959The Logic of Scientific Discovery.1953Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine 1937La prévision : ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives 1999The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

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2022Bias 2012Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?2020Belief, credence, and moral encroachment 2020Bayesian Epistemology

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