The case for the central bank independence

Jakob de Haan · Jan‐Egbert Sturm

45 citations0/0 files storedDOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Global Financial Crisis and Policies European Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Abstract

The position of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is an important issue in the process towards European economic and monetary union (EMU). At the December 1991 meeting in Maastricht, the European council decided that the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. This paper explores the influence of central bank independence on the level and variability of inflation, the level and financing of government budget deficits, and on economic growth. JEL: E58

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 45 citations exist upstream.

References

1975The Political Business Cycle 1988Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles 1984Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 1988Macroeconomics and Politics 1971The Mirage of Steady Inflation 1991The effects of inflation on growth: Some international evidence

Cited by

1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence 1998Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability 2000Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy 2008INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2013The ultimate determinants of central bank independence 2021Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa 1999Deficit Announcements and Interest Rates 2009Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.