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The case for the central bank independence

6 references·11 citing·46 second hop

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References

1975The Political Business Cycle3,951 cited
1988Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles1,652 cited
1984Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic1,492 cited
1988Macroeconomics and Politics736 cited
1971The Mirage of Steady Inflation332 cited
1991The effects of inflation on growth: Some international evidence66 cited

Cited by

1995The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence539 cited
1998Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability269 cited
2000Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy254 cited
2008INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS209 cited
2013The ultimate determinants of central bank independence28 cited
2021Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa27 cited
1999Deficit Announcements and Interest Rates23 cited
2009Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?17 cited
2008Inflation and Central Bank Independence: A Meta Regression Analysis12 cited

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2019

Peaks and Troughs

9 cited

2020Independence of the central bank as a monetary policy authority8 cited