Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement

David P. Baron · David A. Besanko

32 citations0/0 files storedScandinavian Journal of Economics

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Abstract

David P. Baron, David Besanko, Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 3, Information and Incentives. Vol. 1: Organizations and Markets (Sep., 1988), pp. 329-356

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem 1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms 1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information 1986Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis 1987Competition for Agency Contracts 1987Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting

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1997Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies

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