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Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information434 cited
1986Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis423 cited
1987Competition for Agency Contracts246 cited
1987Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting128 cited
1987On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection124 cited
1987Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement124 cited
1989Value of communication in agencies124 cited
1987On the Optimality of Menus of Linear Contracts34 cited

Cited by

1997Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies26 cited

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