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Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
14 references·4 citing·31 second hopsampled
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination (2007)Multi-winner elections: complexity of man…Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard (2003)Universal Voting Protocol Twe…How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? (2003)How many candidates are neede…Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates (2002)Complexity of Manipulating El…Chapter 4 Voting procedures (2002)Chapter 4 Voting proceduresVoting for movies (1999)Voting for moviesProportional Representation (1998)Proportional RepresentationFully Proportional Representation (1995)Fully Proportional Representa…How hard is it to control an election? (1992)How hard is it to control an …Single transferable vote resists strategic voting (1991)Single transferable vote resi…Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election (1989)Voting schemes for which it c…The computational difficulty of manipulating an election (1989)The computational difficulty …Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule (1983)Representative Deliberations …Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Nonuniform bribery (2008)Nonuniform briberyApproximability of manipulating elections (2008)Approximability of manipulati…Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting (2007)Some results on approximating…Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections (2006)Junta distributions and the a…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual Values (1952)On the complexity of achieving proportional representation (2007)On the computation of fully proportional representation (2013)Properties of multiwinner voting rules (2014)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Condorcet Social Choice Functions (1977)Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem (2001)Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation (2002)Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (2014)Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules (1960)Stability in Voting (1961)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)The Calculus of Consent (1960)Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections (2010)Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory (2017)A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007)Considerations on Representative Government (2010)The decision and the organization (1965)Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)The Concept of Representation (1967)The Concept of Representation, by Hanna F. Pitkin (1969)Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees (1990)Justified representation in approval-based committee voting (2017)Elections Can be Manipulated Often (2008)Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules (2009)Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting (2010)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)
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References

  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,247 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,837 cited
  • 1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited
  • 1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
  • 1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
  • 1992How hard is it to control an election?391 cited
  • 1983Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule351 cited
  • 2002Chapter 4 Voting procedures230 cited
  • 1995Fully Proportional Representation211 cited
  • 2003Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard114 cited
  • 2002Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates108 cited
  • 1999Voting for movies102 cited
  • 1998Proportional Representation77 cited
  • 2003How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?63 cited

Cited by

  • 2008Nonuniform bribery54 cited

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2007
Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting
53 cited
  • 2008Approximability of manipulating elections50 cited
  • 2006Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections47 cited