References

• 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
• 2006Repeated Games and Reputations814 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 1956An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs740 cited
• 1993Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium699 cited
• 1995Repeated games with incomplete information536 cited
• 2011Repeated Games with Incomplete Information487 cited
• 1995A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games241 cited
• 1994Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players177 cited
• 1985Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information166 cited
• 2002Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring156 cited
• 2000Experimentation in Markets134 cited
• 1995Subjective games and equilibria117 cited
• 2011Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem107 cited
• 2006The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring105 cited
• 2002Private Information, Strategic Behavior, and Efficiency in Cournot Markets