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When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?

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References

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1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure7,498 cited
1952Social Choice and Individual Values4,699 cited
1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.2,822 cited
1958Classics in the Theory of Public Finance725 cited
1943The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources601 cited
1970Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods449 cited
1973On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule341 cited
1972Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†175 cited
1976Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities166 cited
1969Readings in Welfare Economics147 cited
1970Efficiency Aspects of Local School Finance122 cited

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1987Chapter 12 Markets, governments, and the “new” political economy62 cited

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