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International Institutions and Environmental Policy · Study

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ArticleInternational Institutions and Environmental Policy

Carlo Carraro1998

Article1998

International Institutions and Environmental Policy

Carlo Carraro · Domenico Siniscalco

162 citations·0/0 files stored·European Economic Review

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Climate Change Policy and Economics Game Theory and Voting Systems International Environmental Law and Policies

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References

1994Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements 1993Strategies for the international protection of the environment 1983On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership 1994Farsighted Coalitional Stability 1996Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division 1992International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions 1981Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures 1993Interconnected games and international environmental problems

Cited by

2005Regional versus global cooperation for climate control 2013Targets for global climate policy: An overview 2009A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements 2010Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics 2013The Effect of the Kyoto Protocol on Carbon Emissions 2006COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING

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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

1998International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economyreport · 8 shared references 2003Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollutionchapter · 8 shared references 2002Stable Coalitionspreprint · 7 shared references 2007Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreementsarticle · 6 shared references 2006COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKINGarticle · 6 shared references 2008Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challengesarticle · 5 shared references

Details

Year1998

Typearticle

Published1998-05-01

VenueEuropean Economic Review

ISSN-L0014-2921

Languageen

Citations162

Files0 public / 0

ShelfClimate Change Policy and Economics

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doi10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00118-9

openalex_workW1542121458

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2013Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly: Can highly simplified game theory models provide reliable policy insights?