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The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations
16 references·1 citing·33 second hop
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References

  • 1970The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism22,977 cited
  • 1965The Logic of Collective Action14,183 cited
  • 1971The Theory of Economic Regulation8,084 cited
  • 2021The Theory of Economic Regulation5,483 cited
  • 1974Economic Analysis of Law2,573 cited
  • 1981The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes.1,478 cited
  • 1988Law and Economics904 cited
  • 1984Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety381 cited
  • 1991The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?377 cited
  • 1981Market Power in Antitrust Cases358 cited
  • 1970A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement282 cited
  • 1997The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System251 cited
  • 2012Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts174 cited
  • 1991The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform161 cited
  • 1995Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence153 cited
  • 1985A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value

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151 cited

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  • 2010How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK34 cited