Social Norms and Moral Hazard

Martin A. Dufwenberg · Michael Lundholm

57 citations0/0 files storedThe Economic Journal

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic Theory and Institutions Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social no ...

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1990Foundations of social theory 1969Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 1971An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation 2003UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria 1994A Theory of Conformity 1992Peer Pressure and Partnerships 1992Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection

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