This article develops the notion of reciprocal stakeholder behavior by applying the concept of reciprocal behavior from experimental economics to stakeholder theory. A reciprocal stakeholder behavior model shows under which conditions stakeholders can translate normative demands for prosocial corporate behavior into economic incentives for companies through reciprocal sanctions. The author argues effective reciprocal stakeholder sanctions represent a strong mechanism to implement normative stakeholder demands for prosocial corporate behavior. Conceptually, the author introduces behavioral motives as an important element of stakeholder behavior and stakeholder influence. The argument shows that the notion of reciprocal stakeholder behavior adds substantially to a better understanding of (a) how normative stakeholder demands for prosocial corporate behavior are formulated, and (b) why and under which conditions companies voluntarily comply with stakeholder demands for prosocial corporate behavior that goes beyond legal requirements.
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