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The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions
14 references·4 citing·40 second hop
The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions (2013)The Reliability of Armchair IntuitionsAre philosophers expert intuiters? (2010)Are philosophers expert intui…Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)Disagreement as Evidence: The…A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy (2009)A Defense of the Use of Intui…The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp (2008)The Instability of Philosophi…The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches (2007)The Epistemology of Thought E…PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS (2007)PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THE…On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (2007)On Pragmatic Encroachment in …Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy (2006)Relativism and the Foundation…On the Gettier Problem problem (2006)On the Gettier Problem problemAnalytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy (2006)Analytic Epistemology and Exp…I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING (2005)I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, META…Semantics, cross-cultural style (2003)Semantics, cross-cultural sty…Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethnoepistemology (2003)Metaskepticism: Meditations i…Rethinking intuition : the psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry (1998)Rethinking intuition : the ps…Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test (2022)Philosophical Expertise Put t…Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From (2014)Where Philosophical Intuition…Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise (2014)Philosophical expertise and s…Gettier made ESEE (2013)Gettier made ESEEIs Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)Naming and Necessity (1972)How Children Learn the Meanings of Words (2000)How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism (2007)Philosophical Naturalism (2016)Perception in chess (1973)The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. (1993)The Big Book of Concepts (2002)PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERTISE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF (2011)Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers (2012)Expertise and Intuitions about Reference (2012)Individualism and the Mental (1979)Studies in the Way of Words (1989)Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection (2015)The Intellectual Given (2015)Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)Survey-Driven Romanticism (2010)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2005)Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat (2014)Why Suspend Judging? (2015)Normative Externalism (2019)Pragmatics (1983)Presumptive Meanings (2000)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Knowledge and Assertion (2010)The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect (2010)Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment (2017)Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. (2001)THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (2007)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)The weirdest people in the world? (2010)Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition (2006)Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology (2012)Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case (2011)Philosophical Expertise (2014)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2003Semantics, cross-cultural style711 cited
  • 1998Rethinking intuition : the psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry473 cited
  • 2009Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy432 cited
  • 2008The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp417 cited
  • 2007The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches386 cited
  • 2007On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology331 cited
  • 2007PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS317 cited
  • 2006Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy297 cited
  • 2010Are philosophers expert intuiters?246 cited
  • 2006Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy175 cited
  • 2005I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING173 cited
  • 2006On the Gettier Problem problem157 cited
  • 2009A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy146 cited
  • 2003Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethnoepistemology119 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From49 cited

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2013
Gettier made ESEE
42 cited
  • 2014Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise41 cited
  • 2022Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test20 cited