Normative Systems: Logic, Probability, and Rational Choice

Abstract

Abstract Normative theories of how people should reason have been central to the development of the cognitive science of thinking and reasoning, both as standards against which how thought is assessed and as sources of hypotheses about how thought might operate. This chapter sketches three particularly important types of normative system: logic, probability, and rational choice theory, stressing that these can each be viewed as providing consistency conditions on thought. From the perspective of understanding thought, logic can be viewed as providing consistency conditions on beliefs; probability provides consistency conditions on degrees of beliefs; and rational choice provides consistency conditions on choices. Limitations of current normative approaches are discussed. Throughout this chapter, we provide pointers concerning how these ideas link with the empirical study of thinking and reasoning, as described in this book.

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